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ARTICLE
IS CORPORATE LAW EXPERIENCING ITS
OWN “GROUNDHOG DAY”?
LEONARD I. ROTMAN*
Contemporary corporate law enjoys a rich, albeit contentious, dis-
course. Perhaps no single element of that discourse is more contentious than
the discussion of corporate purpose. Its roots may be traced at least as far
back as the immediate post-Depression era debate between Adolf Berle and
Merrick Dodd. Yet, even after that legendary debate began eight decades
ago, is contemporary corporate law any further ahead in establishing a de-
finitive understanding of corporate purpose?
While the names have changed and the arguments have been restruc-
tured, in many ways corporate law’s antagonistic perspectives and vicious
debates over corporate purpose remain mired in much the same situation
that existed in the time of Berle and Dodd. This scenario is highly reminis-
cent of the movie Groundhog Day, where weatherman Phil Connors is
stuck in a recurring loop where he wakes up each successive morning re-
living the same day again and again. The relevance of that movie to the
issue of corporate purpose lies in what Phil learned from his reliving the
same day over and over again, which ultimately allowed him to exit the
cycle. This article asks whether contemporary corporate law is doomed to
reside permanently in its own time loop, or can it, like Phil Connors, ex-
pand its horizons and discover how to extricate itself from its (indirectly)
self-imposed purgatory?
I. INTRODUCTION
Have the major failings of contemporary corporate law emanated pri-
marily from an inability or unwillingness to learn from its own history? Has
corporate law’s failure to establish and inject corrective “lessons” from its
* B.A., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., Purdy Crawford Chair in Business Law and Professor, Schu-
lich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. I thank Lyman Johnson
for his gracious invitation to be part of this symposium. I dedicate this paper to the memory of my
beloved son, Joseph Malcolm Rotman (Z”L), who lost his battle with cancer on April 9, 2013 at
the age of 13. If only his life could have remained in stasis like the events of Groundhog Day until
a cure for his disease was found.
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history into its contemporary practice resulted in its realization of
Santayana’s warning that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are con-
demned to repeat it”?1
Corporate law is, once again, in a state of turmoil. Corporate activity is
under public scrutiny like never before. In recent years government bailouts
of large financial institutions and two of the “Big Three” North American
auto manufacturers have brought with them tremendous public reaction,
both positive and negative. These events followed closely on the heels of
the well-publicized Enron scandal of 2001, at the time the largest and most
notorious corporate collapse in U.S. history. Meanwhile, media coverage of
the grossly inflated salaries and bonuses paid to high ranking officers of
large corporations—sometimes even when corporate “performance” has not
been particularly positive—provided the public with additional insights into
some of the inner workings of corporate activity that theretofore had re-
mained relatively unknown.
Dismayed by these events and the disparity between the “haves” and
the “have-nots” in contemporary Western society, public antipathy towards
corporations grew. The “Occupy Wall Street” movement that spread
throughout North America, Europe, and Asia was a reaction to these occur-
rences.2 The bulk of the messages emanating from the “Occupy Wall
Street” movement overwhelmingly held corporations responsible for these
developments.
Collectively taking place largely within the last decade, the events de-
scribed above have each thrust corporate issues directly into the public do-
main. But this was not the first time that corporate issues have been in the
public spotlight. Indeed, the rise and subsequent disappearance of corporate
issues within the public sphere has precedents dating back at least as far as
the Great Depression. This is profoundly illustrated in a 1934 article written
by then-Yale law professor and future Supreme Court Justice William O.
Douglas:
[T]he criticism [levied at corporate practices] has been sympto-
matic of indignation and disapproval of many different abuses
and malpractices disclosed in recent years . . . secret loans to of-
ficers and directors, undisclosed profit-sharing plans, timely con-
tracts unduly favorable to affiliated interests, dividend policies
based on false estimates, manipulations of credit resources and
capital structures to the detriment of minority interests, pool oper-
ations, and trading in securities of the company by virtue of inside
information, to mention only a few. These are not peculiar to re-
1. GEORGE SANTAYANA, Reason In Common Sense, in 1 THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1906).
2. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
This movement was created to highlight the huge disparity in income and resources between the
so-called “haves” and “have nots” in contemporary capitalist societies, or what was often refer-
enced by the 99% of society that did not control the bulk of wealth generated therein.
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cent times. They are forms of business activity long known to the
law. . . . [C]onsiderable refashioning of codes of conduct – in
business as well as in law – must be effected if the next cyclical
trend is not to produce as many malpractices and abuses as has
the current one.3
Douglas’ commentary indicates that the behaviors he described were
not new, but rather, contemporary versions of historic business practices.
Just as Douglas illustrated how historic corporate “sharp practices” contin-
ued to reappear in the 1930s, recent events, such as the Enron scandal,
demonstrate that many of the same practices that Douglas criticized in 1934
still exist and are appropriately critiqued eight decades later.
These corporate misdeeds and wrongdoings are merely part of the lat-
est cycle of corporate scandals and errors that have occurred periodically
throughout the history of modern corporate law. The fact that these events
have recurred time and time again warrants an in-depth and sustained exam-
ination of their historical bases that has thus far gone unrealized. These
problematic occurrences may be traced to the debate over corporate purpose
that may, itself, be sourced at least as far back as the immediate post-De-
pression debate between Berle and Dodd.4 The failure to focus on these
issues has resulted in corporate law’s realization of Santayana’s warning.
Santayana’s warning may also be observed in the movie Groundhog
Day,5 where weatherman Phil Connors is stuck in a time loop that sees him
wake up each successive morning reliving the same day over again. The
relevance of that movie to the issue of corporate purpose lies in what Phil
learns from reliving the same day over and over again that finally allows
him to exit the cycle. Is contemporary corporate law doomed to reside per-
manently in its own time loop or can it, like Phil Connors, expand its hori-
zons and discover how to extricate itself from its (indirectly) self-imposed
purgatory?
Without looking to the historical and theoretical underpinnings of the
corporation, how is it truly possible to understand the practical implications
of this statutorily-created juridical person? This requires us to revisit the
history of the modern corporate form in order to understand it, learn from it,
3. William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1306
(1934).
4. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931) (stating that all powers granted to corporate management should be used only for the
benefit of the shareholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (arguing that anyone conducting business can do so with their own
interests ahead of customer and creditor interests); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Manag-
ers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (rebutting Dodd’s position); E. Merrick
Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?,
2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935). The crash of the stock market in 1929 no doubt influenced this
debate. See also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008).
5. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993).
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and proceed ahead rather than regard the past as unchangeable or unchal-
lengeable. Yet, even when fundamental corporate law concepts are ques-
tioned, as occurred during oral argument in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission (“Citizens United”),6 as will be shown herein, the
questioning is quickly shut down.
Against the backdrop of failing to understand the practical implications
of corporations and corporate behavior because of the lack of attention paid
to their historical and theoretical underpinnings came the collapse of energy
giant Enron Corp., one of the most successful American corporations in the
1980s and 1990s, and the seventh largest U.S. corporation in terms of reve-
nue.7 It filed for bankruptcy amidst allegations of conflict of interest and
other financial improprieties. Shortly thereafter, a number of other major
U.S. corporations suffered similar fates and generated notable scandals of
their own. However, it was Enron which came to symbolize the worst ex-
cesses of corporate corruption and became the focus of attempts to reform
corporate governance standards.8 On July 16, 2002, the American Bar As-
sociation Task Force on Corporate Responsibility released a preliminary
report, which detailed the significant impact of the Enron scandal and the
Task Force’s response to it:
Few events in business history since the Great Depression have
had the public impact of the stunning collapse of Enron Corp. and
other major companies in the past year. . . . [Enron’s collapse] is
merely one of the most notorious in a disturbing series of recent
lapses at large corporations involving false or misleading finan-
cial statements and alleged misconduct by executive officers. In-
vestor confidence in the quality and integrity of public company
corporate governance is compromised, and the pace of calls by
the President, Congress, the SEC, stock markets and other inter-
ested groups for regulatory reform has quickened dramatically.
. . . .
The core conclusion of the Task Force, however, is that, as evi-
denced by recent failures of corporate responsibility, the exercise
by such independent participants of active and informed steward-
ship of the best interests of the corporation has in too many in-
stances fallen short. Unless the governance system is changed in
ways designed to encourage such active and informed steward-
ship, the Task Force believes that public trust and investor confi-
dence in the corporate governance system will not be restored.9
6. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2899 (2010); The Five Hundred Largest U.S.
Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2001, at F-1.
8. For this reason, “Enron” is often used as a proxy for the various corporate scandals that
arose in the early stages of the twenty-first century.
9. James Cheek III et al., Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility, 54 MERCER L. REV. 789, 792–93, 796–97 (2003).
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While the ABA Task Force paper indicates the inactive and unin-
formed stewardship of corporations, it fails to identify why this has oc-
curred—and with it, the resultant lack of public trust and investor
confidence in the corporate governance system. It is suggested that a pri-
mary reason for this failure is the historical inability to identify the appro-
priate foundation of corporate purpose—that is, why corporations exist and
to whom they are responsible.
Is contemporary corporate law, as suggested in the abstract to this pa-
per, any further ahead in its understanding of why corporations exist some
eight decades after the legendary Berle-Dodd debate on corporate purpose
began? This is not corporate law’s only long-standing doctrinal deficiency.
One may equally ask whether the reasons for corporate law’s fiduciary un-
derpinnings, as expressed in notable cases like Meinhard v. Salmon10 and
Guth v. Loft, Inc.,11 or the implications of corporate personality, have re-
ceived meaningful attention or if they have stagnated as well.
Consistent with Santayana’s warning, the consequence of failing to
learn from corporate law’s history has been the recurrence of the activities
condemned by Douglas in his 1934 article. Corporate names once associ-
ated with success and wealth like Adelphia, Enron, Global Crossing, Hol-
linger, Parmalat, Qwest, Tyco, and WorldCom are now synonymous with
scandal, greed, and corruption. Nonetheless, the dangers of ignoring history
are still being experienced by corporate law. That is evident, for example,
by illustrating the manner in which Justice Sotomayor’s questioning of the
continued relevance of the corporate personality doctrine was received in
Citizens United.12
II. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, CITIZENS UNITED
AND CORPORATE PERSONALITY
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s first oral argument after she was appointed
to the Supreme Court of the United States came in the notorious Citizens
United case.13 The key issue in Citizens United was whether limits on cor-
porate contributions for political purposes imposed under the McCain-Fein-
10. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the ‘disintegrating ero-
sion’ of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a
level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”).
11. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“[P]ublic policy, existing through the years, and derived
from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that
demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous ob-
servance of his duty . . . .”).
12. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13. Id.
1050 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:4
gold Act of 200214 infringed corporations’ freedom of speech rights under
the First Amendment. In determining the answer to this question, Justice
Sotomayor inquired during oral argument whether it was juridically neces-
sary to regard corporations as legal persons:
[W]hat you are suggesting is that the courts who created corpora-
tions as persons, gave birth to corporations as persons, and there
could be an argument made that that was the Court’s error to start
with, not Austin or McConnell, but the fact that the Court imbued
a creature of State law with human characteristics.15
In asking this seemingly benign question, Justice Sotomayor did what
corporate law has largely failed to do for much of its history: question some
of its most basic assumptions in order to determine whether they remain
appropriate in the present day. Indeed, strict and unquestioned adherence to
the doctrine of corporate personality has resulted in a host of unforeseen
problems stemming from that characterization’s implications. Notwith-
standing this reality, Justice Sotomayor’s willingness to ask what others
would not ask came at the cost of challenges made to her reputation, specif-
ically the imputation that she knew little or nothing about corporate law.
Media outlets jumped on Justice Sotomayor’s query as to whether it
was necessary for the courts to have granted human-like characteristics to
these creatures of statute. Headlines such as “Sotomayor Issues Challenge
to a Century of Corporate Law”16 and “Sotomayor’s ‘Provocative Com-
ment’ Questioned Corporate Law Foundations”17 sprung up immediately
after she made her comments.
Justice Sotomayor’s inquisition was controversial because corpora-
tions had been considered, for more than one hundred years prior to Citi-
zens United, to be distinct legal individuals, separate and apart from their
directors, officers, shareholders, employees, creditors, etc., under what is
known as the doctrine of corporate personality.18 Indeed, there is little, if
any, contemporary debate over the corporation’s existence as a legal person
separate and apart from the personality of its management or shareholders.
This doctrine was articulated early in the twentieth century by the legendary
constitutional and administrative scholar A.V. Dicey, who stated:
14. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(amending the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide bipartisan campaign reform).
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310 (2010) (No. 08-205).
16. Jess Bravin, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1253140
88285517643.
17. Debra Cassens Weiss, A.B.A. J., Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/arti
cle/sotomayors_provocative_comment_questioned_corporate_law_foundations/.
18. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Providence Bank v.
Billings, 29 U.S. 514 (1830); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Salomon v.
Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).
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When a body of twenty or two thousand or two hundred thousand
men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some
common purpose, they create a body which, by no fiction of law
but by the very nature of things, differs from the individuals of
whom it is constituted.19
The reason for the sensational response to Justice Sotomayor’s com-
ments was premised on nothing more than that she had the “audacity” to
question whether it was truly necessary to regard corporations as legal per-
sons notwithstanding such a long-standing, well-recognized, and founda-
tional corporate law doctrine. The reality, however, is that the doctrine of
corporate personality has resulted in a host of unforeseen problems stem-
ming from that characterization’s implications.
The relative ease with which incorporation is achieved creates the po-
tential abuse of a corporation’s independent legal existence by using the
corporate vehicle as a means to shield the socially or economically inappro-
priate conduct of its investors. This may include, for example, the inten-
tional undercapitalizing of a corporation or the use of the corporate vehicle
to commit fraud. In such scenarios, individuals having bona fide claims
against corporations incorporated as a result, or in the face, of such fraudu-
lent backdrops may be unable to obtain relief, insofar as incorporation
shields shareholders from financial responsibility for the corporation’s
actions.
Rather than looking to re-examine the corporate personality doctrine,
judicial reaction to the perceived inequity of such scenarios led to what is
commonly referred to as “piercing the corporate veil.”20 In scenarios where
judges deem it necessary to “disregard the corporate entity or personality,
and instead to consider the economic realities behind the legal facade,”21
they may exercise their discretion to look beyond that facade and foist lia-
bility upon sufficiently “deep pocketed” corporate shareholders rather than
restricting claims to the assets of the corporation itself.22
19. A.V. Dicey, The Combination Laws as Illustrating the Relation between Law and Opin-
ion in England During the Nineteenth Century, 17 HARV. L. REV. 511, 513 (1904).
20. This notion has a lengthy history, being traceable certainly to decisions of the early parts
of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809) (stating
that the characteristics of individuals within corporations can be examined to assess jurisdictional
issues).
21. Clarkson Co. v. Zhelka, (1967) 64 D.L.R. 2d 457, 469 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). Note also I.
Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 499 (1912)
(“[C]ourts of law do not tolerate any attempt to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by means of a
resort to ‘the veil of corporate entity.’ The ingenuity of the rogue, with his arsenal of scholastic
sophistry, was met and overwhelmed by the sane and stern refusal to be bound by the entity
theory.”).
22. This principle is one of universal application. See Clarkson Co. v. Zhelka, (1967) 64
D.L.R. 2d 457; Stockton v. Cent. R.R. Co., 24 A. 964, 973 (N.J. Ch.1892) (“It must not be thought
that courts are powerless to strip off disguises to thwart the purposes of the law. Whenever such
disguises in fact appear, they can readily be disrobed. The difficulty is in showing the disguises,
not in penetrating them when they appear.”). Note also Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd. v.
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The exercise of judicial discretion to circumvent the doctrine of corpo-
rate personality is not unlimited, however. It has been restricted to circum-
stances where it would be inequitable, such as where “it would be flagrantly
opposed to justice,” where “a company is formed for the express purpose of
doing a wrongful or unlawful act, or if when formed, those in control ex-
pressly direct a wrongful thing to be done,” or where “the company is the
mere agent of a controlling [in]corporator.”23 Notwithstanding such limita-
tions, many questions still surround when the corporate veil may be pierced,
making its status as an exception to the corporate personality doctrine un-
certain at best.24
Some may have thought Justice Sotomayor could only have made such
an inquiry because they assumed she possessed a limited background in
corporate law. But that is not the case. While she began her legal career as
an Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan, prior to her appointment to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1992,
she was practicing commercial litigation as a partner at a firm whose “typi-
cal clients were significant corporations doing international business.”25
Justice Sotomayor’s question as to whether corporations need to be re-
garded as separate legal persons in law was thus not a question borne out of
ignorance. Instead, it was a legitimate query about the concept of corporate
personality, a topic that has caused a host of problems in the law since its
origins in nineteenth century academic commentary and jurisprudence.26
The doctrine of corporate personality is fundamental to corporate law
and holds that the corporation is to be understood by analogy to a naturally
born person. Like a natural person, a corporation is “born” and can “die”
(although it need not do so). It may sue and be sued in its own name. It may
be killed or it may commit suicide. The corporate personality doctrine, as
with the doctrine of corporate purpose discussed above, is a long-standing
assumption of contemporary corporate law that is generally deemed to be
off-limits to questioning by judges and corporate law scholars. While the
Inland Revenue Comm’rs, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1241 (A.C.) at 1254 (Eng.), where Lord Denning
M.R. states:
The doctrine laid down in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22, has to be watched very
carefully. It has often been supposed to cast a veil over the personality of a limited company
through which the courts cannot see. But that is not true. The courts can and often do draw aside
the veil. They can, and often do, pull off the mask. They look to see what really lies behind. The
legislature has shown the way with group accounts and the rest. And the courts should follow suit.
23. Clarkson, 64 D.L.R. 2d, at 470.
24. See the discussion in LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 429–432 (2005).
25. Press Release, The White House, Announcement of Sotomayor’s Supreme Court Nomi-
nation (May 26, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Background-on-
Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor.
26. Justice Sotomayor is not the only U.S. Supreme Court justice to have openly questioned
whether it is necessary to ascribe characteristics of personhood to corporations pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85–90 (1938)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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corporation’s separate legal existence from its management and sharehold-
ers is well-accepted, the further implications of this separation remain con-
tentious. Is the corporation merely a funnel through which profit
maximization for shareholders is the ultimate goal? Alternatively, are share-
holders merely one of a number of stakeholder groups whose interests must
be accounted for in the conduct of corporate management?27
In order to exist, corporations incorporate some rather significant as-
sumptions—assumptions that would not necessarily flow organically from
the desire to create a more sophisticated business entity than the partner-
ship. Without first asking the types of questions posed above and proffering
answers to them, how are we to understand whether these assumptions are
valid, not to mention the various reasons why corporations exist? Secondly,
without determining whether these assumptions remain valid or understand-
ing why corporations exist, how can we ascertain whether contemporary
corporate practices remain consistent with the rationales for their existence
or whether the corporate vehicle has “run off the rails” and taken on an
identity inconsistent with its historical foundations? If the latter has, in fact,
occurred, perhaps a reigning in of corporate behavior is appropriate. Yet,
without asking some necessary and important questions, we are unable to
make this vital determination. Instead, we are obliged to trudge along with
the status quo intact, unable to do anything to prevent that status quo from
causing major disturbances or disruption to modern economies.
III. GROUNDHOG DAY AND ITS MEANING FOR CONTEMPORARY
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The situation illustrated above, whereby corporate law continually
revisits the same type of scandals and controversies that have dogged it for
decades, is reminiscent of the plot in the movie Groundhog Day. In that
movie, comedian Bill Murray portrays Phil Connors, a television
weatherman from Pittsburgh who travels to Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania to
film the town’s famous Groundhog Day celebration with his executive pro-
ducer, Rita (Andie MacDowell) and cameraman, Larry (Chris Elliott).28
This is an annual event for Phil, who is less than enthusiastic about partici-
pating in it yet again.
Misanthropic Phil is narcissistic and egocentric. He actively disdains
Punxsutawney and what he perceives as the town’s tacky celebration. He
cannot wait to leave, so after filming a news spot about whether the town’s
groundhog, Punxsutawney Phil, sees his shadow, weatherman Phil rushes
27. For further discussion on the issue of corporate purpose, see Leonard I. Rotman, De-
bunking the “End of History” Thesis for Corporate Law, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219
(2010).
28. See generally THE PUNXSUTAWNEY GROUNDHOG CLUB, http://www.groundhog.org/ (last
visited Feb. 11, 2014) (providing information as the official Punxsutawney Groundhog Day
website).
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his team back into their van to return to Pittsburgh. Unfortunately for Phil, a
blizzard has shut down the highway and all other forms of travel and com-
munication. The crew is then forced to return to Punxsutawney, although
Phil’s extreme reluctance to go back is evident in the following exchange
with a state trooper:
Phil: Hey commander, what’s going on?
State Trooper: There’s nothing going on. We’re closing the road.
Big blizzard moving in.
Phil: What blizzard? It’s a couple of flakes.
State Trooper: Don’t you listen to the weather? We got a major
storm here.
Phil: I make the weather! All of this moisture coming up out of
the Gulf is gonna push off to the east and hit Altoona.
State Trooper: Pal, you got that moisture on your head. Now you
can go back to Punxsutawney, or you can go ahead and freeze to
death. It’s your choice. So what’s it gonna be?
Phil: [pauses] I’m thinking . . .29
Phil reluctantly decides not to travel and returns to the same bed and
breakfast residence he stayed at the previous night. The next morning, Phil
wakes up to the same song followed by the same disc jockey banter on the
radio that he heard on Groundhog Day. When he looks outside, he sees a
host of people walking towards Gobbler’s Knob, the home of Punx-
sutawney Phil. Phil quickly discovers that it is Groundhog Day all over
again.
Phil is initially in disbelief. How could he possibly be reliving Ground-
hog Day? Incredibly, he finds himself forced to experience that same day,
in exactly the same way, ad nauseam, while the others in the town remain
blissfully unaware of this strange phenomenon and live out the day as if for
the first time.
Phil initially reacts narcissistically to the Groundhog Day time loop.
He takes advantage of the situation without fear of long-term repercussions,
becoming gluttonous, lecherous, thieving, irresponsible, and reckless. He
eats and drinks to excess. He tricks a woman he previously did not know
into sleeping with him by learning all about her on successive days and then
using that information to seduce her by pretending he was a former high
school classmate of hers. He steals money from an armored car by memo-
rizing the incompetent guard’s daily pattern. He drives drunk and reck-
lessly. However, his attempts to win the affection of his producer Rita by
tricking her into liking him repeatedly fail.
Once the novelty of self-indulgence wears off, Phil becomes despon-
dent. He becomes abusive to the townsfolk and to Larry the cameraman. He
mocks the Groundhog Day celebration by recording ludicrously offensive
29. IMDB, Groundhog Day (1993) – Quotes, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107048/trivia?tab
=qt&ref_=tt_trv_qu (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
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reports on the festival and offending the other participants. He then en-
deavours to stop the time loop by numerous attempts at suicide, yet wakes
up each successive Groundhog Day morning as before.
In perhaps the ultimate attempt to end the time loop he is trapped in,
Phil kidnaps Punxsutawney Phil in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent
Groundhog Day from recurring. His logic: there can’t be a Groundhog Day
without the groundhog. He drives a vehicle carrying himself and Punx-
sutawney Phil off of a cliff and into a rock quarry, exploding the vehicle on
the rocks below. However, as always, Phil wakes up the very next morning
on Groundhog Day. Eventually, Phil realizes that, like his groundhog name-
sake, he cannot control his fate; rather, he can only alter how he responds to
it.
Resigned to his inability to escape the cycle of successive Groundhog
Days and with the advice of Rita, Phil eventually uses the opportunity pro-
vided by his plight to improve himself. He learns, inter alia, to play jazz
piano, speak French and become a master ice sculptor. Phil also uses his
knowledge of the day’s events to assist others. He changes a flat tire for a
group of older women, saves an engaged couple’s marriage plans and pre-
vents death and injury, but he is not omnipotent and cannot save the life of
an old beggar as much as he tries.
As Phil gets to know himself better, he changes from a self-obsessed
jerk into a selfless and giving individual who is much appreciated and be-
loved in Punxsutawney. Finally, after a great many years,30 and an equal
number of attempts to win Rita’s heart, Phil finally succeeds and is then
able to leave Punxsutawney. He finally wins over Rita by being true to her,
as well as to his own feelings, instead of trying to manipulate her into sleep-
ing with him. However, the town and its people had ingratiated themselves
30. While the movie never reveals precisely how long Phil Connors remains mired in the
recurring events of successive Groundhog Days, according to Groundhog Day director Harold
Ramis on the movie DVD commentary, Phil spent approximately 10 years trapped in Punx-
sutawney. One article discussed this and other pieces of evidence in calculating that Phil spent
“3176 repeated Groundhog days, or 453 weeks, or 105 months, or 8.7 years. Precisely, 8 years, 8
months, and 16 days” in Punxsutawney. WOLF GNARDS, How Long Does Bill Murray Spend In
Groundhog Day?, http://www.wolfgnards.com/index.php/2009/06/16/how-long-does-billy-mur
ray-spend-in-grou (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). However, director Ramis, responding to that article,
said the following:
I think the 10-year estimate is too short. It takes at least 10 years to get good at anything,
and alloting for the down time and misguided years he spent, it had to be more like 30 or
40 years. . . People [like the blogger] have way too much time on their hands. They
could be learning to play the piano or speak French or sculpt.
WOLF GNARDS, Harold Ramis Responds to the Wolf Gnards, http://www.wolfgnards.com/index
.php/2009/08/18/harold-ramis-responds-to-the-wolf-gnards (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). What is
clear is that Phil has stayed in Punxsutawney long enough to, inter alia: (1) get to know all of the
townsfolk by name and learn their stories; (2) sequentially memorize all the events of Groundhog
Day; (3) learn French; (4) become a classically trained pianist; (5) become an expert ice sculptor,
and; (6) learn how to consistently flick playing cards into a hat (something Phil himself indicates
in the movie that takes about 6 months to master: “Six months. Four to five hours a day, and you’d
be an expert.”).
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to him over the years he remained in the time loop. Consequently, rather
than leaving Punxsutawney, he chooses to live there with Rita.31
Why is a paper on the topic of corporate law, history, and theory dis-
cussing a movie about a weatherman who hates Groundhog Day and is,
ironically, forced to continually relive it? Groundhog Day is a tale of intro-
spection and self-improvement. The process Phil goes through emphasizes
his need to discover what is truly important rather than the superficialities
of fame, gluttony, and lechery he is initially preoccupied with. His exis-
tence was empty, much like the calories of the donuts and alcohol he con-
sumed in excess. Further, he learned that the answer to ending his misery
was not suicide, but the process of self-reflection and awareness. The Phil
Connors who first set foot in Punxsutawney—the man who actively dis-
dained the town’s Groundhog Day festival and the people who celebrated
it—was not the same Phil who grew to love the charm of the sleepy little
town, its inhabitants, and its quirky annual festival so much that he did not
want to leave. After spending years in Punxsutawney, Phil eventually real-
izes that true satisfaction in life comes not from focusing inward upon one’s
own desires, but from turning outward and being concerned with the needs
of others. Corporate law could stand to learn the lessons that Phil Connors
learns in Groundhog Day. At a minimum, it would benefit from engaging in
the same process of introspection and self-improvement that Phil does.
For a good chunk of the movie, Phil, like many people, regards himself
as a victim of fate, a person who is unable to control his own destiny. But
he has one important advantage the rest of us do not: he gets to replay his
life over and over again until he learns from his mistakes and finds his truth.
Once Phil figures things out and “gets it right,” he is then able to escape his
purgatory. Ironically, at that point he no longer finds the need to escape,
since his purgatory has become his place of salvation.
The relevant question for the larger issues herein is whether corporate
law is able to accomplish the same thing that Phil Connors did in Ground-
hog Day. It may also be asked whether, assuming corporate law is poten-
tially able to accomplish what Phil did in Groundhog Day, it, in fact, even
wants to attempt such a feat. This paper asks whether corporate law is des-
tined (or merely wants) to reside permanently in its own Punxsutawney or if
it, like Phil Connors, can be sufficiently introspective to critically examine
the bases for the difficulties it has repeatedly encountered. This process of
critical introspection is what will enable corporate law to extricate itself
from its (indirectly) self-imposed purgatory and make it better equipped to
avoid the problems and scandals that have continually plagued it over the
years.
31. While Phil chooses to live in Punxsutawney, he still seeks to maintain his ability to leave
easily by saying that rather than buying a house, they should start by renting.
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In order to move beyond the limitations that corporate law has im-
posed upon itself and left largely unquestioned for decades, greater atten-
tion must be paid to the implications of foundational corporate law
concepts, such as corporate purpose and corporate personality to discover
whether, in the contemporary setting, those implications remain appropriate
and effective. The media’s reaction to Justice Sotomayor’s questioning in
oral argument in the Citizens United case is illustrative of the considerable
reluctance and resistance to raising such issues within the realm of corpo-
rate law. Further, what happened to Justice Sotomayor illustrates that where
such issues are, in fact, raised, they do not come without potential costs.
If corporate law can overcome such initial resistance to asking some
difficult questions and gazing critically into its own soul, it is well equipped
to deal with the potential effects of these foundational investigations. One
of the chief attributes of the common law has always been its ability to
evolve with changing social attitudes and mores. That requires corporate
law, like other areas of law, to constantly reassess the vitality and usability
of its foundational concepts. Unless it can be demonstrated that challenging
these foundational concepts is inappropriate, corporate law must adapt and
evolve. That will enable it, like Phil Connors, to become more meaningful
and relevant within its sphere of influence. Yet, assuming corporate law is
theoretically able to accomplish what Phil did, it remains to be seen
whether: (a) it is interested in attempting to achieve such a feat; and (b) if it
is interested, how long it will take for corporate law to accomplish that feat.
IV. CONCLUSION
Questioning the existence of a long-standing—or even foundational—
theory need not necessarily emanate from the desire to overturn it, nor must
it necessarily lead to that result. Rather, the objective may simply be to
learn from the developments of the past, to both help us in the present and
to move more positively towards the future. This requires us to continually
reevaluate whether the contemporary understanding of law and its theoreti-
cal underpinnings remain both necessary and appropriate in the modern
day. That is what Justice Sotomayor was attempting to do in Citizens
United, which is consonant with what Phil Connors was forced to do in
order to leave Punxsutawney in the movie Groundhog Day.
At this point in the post-Enron, post-bailout, and post-2008 financial
collapse era, corporate law has yet to substantively address issues it has
largely neglected throughout much of its history. For quite some time, soci-
ety has not seriously addressed the implications of the foundational ques-
tions: why do corporations exist?; why are corporations separate legal
individuals?; and for whose benefit do corporations exist?32 During that
32. Until the rise of progressive corporate law scholarship in the 1980s as a response to the
law and economics movement, it could be suggested that these types of investigations had not
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time, corporate law has suffered damage to its reputation and has lost the
public’s confidence in its ability to effectively govern corporate actors. Cor-
porate law is consequently in desperate need of a sustained, self-reflective
process. What will come of such a process will depend largely on how
seriously it is advanced and the extent to which it is meaningfully sustained.
Self-reflection is a necessary part of anything that changes or evolves
over time. The reinvigoration or rejection of foundational corporate law
concepts brought on by the process of self-reflection is a vital part of main-
taining corporate law’s contemporary relevance. We need not reinvent his-
tory, but, as Phil Connors learns in Groundhog Day, accept history’s
realities and heed its lessons. This is consistent with the sentiments ex-
pressed by President Barack Obama in his inaugural speech characterizing
the challenges that lie ahead for America as a result of the then-current
economic climate, the effects of which are still being felt:
That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. . . .
Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and ir-
responsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure
to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age. . . .
. . . .
Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force
for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom
is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a
watchful eye, the market can spin out of control – and that a na-
tion cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous. . . .
. . . .
Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we
meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success
depends – hard work and honesty, courage and fair play, toler-
ance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism – these things are old.
These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress
throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these
truths.33
For this type of self-reflective examination to have the kind of substan-
tive effect required for corporate law to initiate a new era of understanding
of corporate purpose and function, it must heed Santayana’s warning and
been undertaken in any substantive way since the Berle-Dodd debate ended in the late 1930s; see
Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constitu-
ency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 583 (1992) (stating “the confluence of the law and economics
scholars’ deconstruction of the corporate form and the age of takeovers has stimulated the most
systematic and searching questioning of the legitimacy of corporate law in over fifty years”); see
also id. at. 583 n.17 (stating “[t]he last great wave of intellectual interest in corporate theory
occurred during the 1920s and 1930s.”).
33. Obama’s Inaugural Speech, CNN POLITICS.COM http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/
01/20/obama.politics/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
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take necessary steps to avoid the implications of that warning by not ignor-
ing the lessons of the past. Then, and only then, may contemporary corpo-
rate law depart its own Punxsutawney for a brighter future.
